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Abstract 
This paper investigates whether top-tier M&A investment bankers (financial advisors) 
create value for acquirers with different financial conditions in both the short and 
long term via analyzing 2860 completed US deals during 1990–2009. Our results 
show that top-tier investment bankers improve constrained acquirers’ short- (5 days) 
and long-term (36 months) performance by 1.17% and 13.67% respectively, after 
controlling for firm, deal and market characteristics. Constrained acquirers advised by 
top-tier investment bankers pay the lowest bid premiums, while unconstrained 
acquirers that retain top-tier investment bankers pay the highest advisory fees. Our 
findings imply that constrained acquirers tend to retain top-tier investment bankers to 
gain superior synergy, while unconstrained acquirers appear to retain top-tier 
investment bankers to ensure the deal completion. 
 
JEL Classification: G14; G34. 
Keywords: Mergers and acquisitions; Investment Banker; Financial constraint; Firm 
performance. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In this paper, we investigate whether top-tier merger and acquisition (M&A) 
investment bankers (financial advisors), ranked by deal value, can help their clients 
outperform in both the short and long term, controlling for acquirer financial 
conditions. We categorize acquirers into three groups based on their financial 
conditions: constrained, neutral, and unconstrained. We show that top-tier investment 
bankers create value in both the short and long term, but only for constrained 
acquirers. 
Top-tier investment bankers charge much higher advisory fees and are supposed to 
provide their clients with superior service (Golubov et al., 2012). However, the 
empirical evidence on this reputation–quality mechanism remains inconclusive. The 
majority of studies find that acquirers advised by top-tier advisors do not outperform 
those advised by non-top-tier advisors and may even obtain negative abnormal returns 
(Michel et al., 1991; Servaes and Zenner, 1996; Rau, 2000; Hunter and Jagtiani, 2003; 
Ismail, 2010).  
In contrast, several researchers argue that top-tier advisors are associated with 
superior skills in identifying synergistic targets and securing a larger proportion of 
synergy for their clients. Therefore, top-tier advisors are capable of improving 
acquirer performance (Bao and Edmans, 2011; Golubov et al., 2012). Additionally, a 
higher reputation is associated with a higher market share. To maintain this market 
share, top-tier advisors must therefore maintain their reputation, which is achieved by 
providing superior service. 
Previous literature shows that acquiring shareholders in general do not gain from 
M&A deals or even destroy firm value (Moeller et al., 2004), despite the fact that 
majority of the deals are advised by investment banks (Golubov et al., 2012). 
Overconfidence of acquirers’ CEOs has been a popular appeal as an explanation of 
why acquirers are in general on the losing end of M&A games (Roll, 1986; Doukas 
and Petmezas, 2007; Malmendier and Tate, 2008; Croci et al., 2010). CEO 
overconfidence also relates to acquirers’ financial status. Specifically, CEOs of 
unconstrained acquirers tend to be overconfident (Malmendier and Tate, 2005, 2008). 
Acquirers with sufficient internal resources are more likely to conduct mergers, while 
 3 
they tend to forgo mergers if external finance is required (Jensen, 1986; Harford, 
1999). Therefore, acquirers with different financial conditions exhibit different 
behaviors, which helps to explain the inconclusive evidence on the role of investment 
bankers in the M&A deals. In particular, overconfident acquirers with abundant 
internal resources are likely to overestimate the returns generated internally and 
believe outsiders undervalue their firms, and therefore, they do not rely on investment 
bankers to obtain synergistic gains, and employ top-tier advisors solely to pursue deal 
completion. In contrast, acquirers with financial constraints do not have abundant 
internal funds to finance M&A deals, and high financing costs force constrained firms 
to make acquisition decision rationally and carefully. Therefore, constrained acquirers 
are likely to retain top-tier advisors to obtain acquisition synergy.  
These conjectures are strongly supported by our empirical results. Investigating a 
large sample of US M&A deals over the 1990–2009 period, we show that top-tier 
investment bankers help financially constrained acquirers gain significant abnormal 
returns in both the short and long term. In contrast, the effects of top-tier investment 
bankers are insignificant for unconstrained and neutral acquirers, which is consistent 
with most of previous literature1. In addition, unconstrained acquirers who retain top-
tier advisors pay highest advisory fees. However, overpayment does not translate into 
stronger bargaining power. These results suggest that constrained acquirers retain top-
tier advisors in order to gain superior performance, whereas unconstrained acquirers 
retain top-tier advisors simply for the reason of deal completion.  
This research contributes to the M&A literature in the following two aspects. First, 
this paper sheds new light on puzzling empirical evidence on the effects of top-tier 
investment bankers. We highlight that the effects of top-tier advisors are sensitive to 
acquirer financial conditions. By examining abnormal returns to acquirers in different 
advisor–constraint groups, we provide novel evidence on the impact of top-tier 
advisors on acquirer performance. In particular, we find that top-tier advisors create 
value for their clients, but only if their clients are financially constrained acquirers. 
Second, most studies 2  only focus on investment bankers’ effects on acquirer 
performance in the short term. We argue that merger synergies should be realized in 
                                                                
1 See Michel et al. (1991); Servaes and Zenner (1996); Rau (2000); Hunter and Jagtiani (2003); Ismail (2010). 
2 See Bowers and Miller (1990); Michel et al. (1991); McLaughlin (1992); Servaes and Zenner (1996); Kale et al. 
(2003); da Silva Rosa et al. (2004); Walter et al. (2008); Schiereck et al. (2009); Ismail (2010); Bao and Edmans 
(2011); Golubov et al. (2012).    
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the long term and eventually perceived by the market. Therefore, this paper 
simultaneously investigates the effects of advisors on acquirer performance in both 
the short and long term.  
Our findings also have important implications for practitioners. Acquirers who retain 
top-tier advisors pay lower bid premiums and outperform acquirers advised by non-
top-tier advisors in both the short and long term, although higher advisory fees are 
charged. However, we emphasize that the positive effects of top-tier investment 
bankers are offset by acquirers’ overconfidence. Stock markets reward acquirers who 
make acquisition decisions rationally and elaborately. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature 
and constructs the main hypothesis. Section 3 presents the data selection procedure 
and methodology. Section 4 discusses the empirical results. Robustness tests are 
carried out in Section 5. Section 6 concludes this paper. 
2. Literature review and hypothesis 
The role of investment bankers in the M&A markets has been highlighted by an 
increasing number of researchers. The majority of these studies show that the 
retention of top-tier advisors, as measured by market share or reputation, does not 
significantly improve acquirer performance and can even result in negative market 
reactions. Michel et al. (1991) find that Drexel Burnham Lambert, one of the less 
prestigious banks, helps its clients earn the highest announcement abnormal returns, 
while First Boston, Bulge Bracket, achieves the poorest performance. In other words, 
bank reputation does not relate to better takeover performance. Servaes and Zenner 
(1996) show that acquirer announcement returns do not differ across in-house deals 
and deals advised by investment banks. The differences in announcement returns 
between acquirers advised by top-tier and non–top-tier advisors are also insignificant.  
Rau (2000) finds that acquirers advised by top-tier investment banks obtain higher 
announcement abnormal returns in tender offers but lower announcement abnormal 
returns in mergers compared to acquirers advised by lower-tier investment banks. 
Furthermore, in both mergers and tender offers advised by top-tier investment banks, 
the completion rate of value-increasing transactions measured by announcement 
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) is not significantly higher than that of value-
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decreasing transactions. In contrast, compared to the proportion of tender offers with 
negative announcement CARs, second-tier banks help acquirers complete a 
significantly higher proportion of tender offers with positive announcement CARs.  
Hunter and Jagtiani (2003) use a unique method employing the difference between the 
transaction values at the announcement date and the effective date as a proxy for 
acquisition gains, and suggest that acquisition gains are inversely associated with the 
retention of top-tier investment bankers. Furthermore, Ismail (2010) reports that 
acquirers advised by first-tier banks obtain negative announcement returns, whereas 
second-tier banks help their clients gain positive returns around announcements.  
In contrast, the latest evidence suggests that top-tier advisors have superior skills and 
therefore create value for their clients. Specifically, Golubov et al. (2012) argue that 
acquirers advised by top-tier advisors outperform acquirers advised by non–top-tier 
advisors in public acquisitions. The authors find that the retention of top-tier advisors 
led to $65.83 million shareholder gains for acquirers, on average, in public 
acquisitions during 1996–2009. More importantly, their results suggest that the 
improvement in performance can be attributed to top-tier advisors’ skills in 
identifying synergistic targets and negotiating higher shares of synergies for acquirers.  
In fact, acquirer acquisition decision can be affected by CEO overconfidence. 
Overconfident CEOs are more likely to make acquisitions and overpay targets (Roll, 
1986; Hayward and Hambrick, 1997; Hietala et al., 2003). Doukas and Petmezas 
(2007) and Croci et al. (2010) find that overconfident acquirers underperform rational 
acquirers. Additionally, Malmendier and Tate (2008) find that financially 
unconstrained firms are more likely to exhibit overconfidence and overconfident 
CEOs tend to conduct value-destroying acquisitions, while firms with financial 
constraints are reluctant to raise external capital and forgo mergers if external finance 
is required. Therefore, overconfidence of CEOs together with acquirer financial 
conditions plays a significant role in explaining acquirer performance.  
In addition to the overconfidence hypothesis, Jensen (1986) introduces the free cash 
flow hypothesis and argues that firms with excess cash reserves tend to make value-
decreasing takeover deals. Smith and Kim (1994) investigate the influence of free 
cash flow and financial slack on announcement abnormal returns. Their study shows 
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that acquirers with high free cash flow obtain significantly negative announcement 
abnormal returns, whereas slack-poor acquirers gain significantly positive 
announcement abnormal returns. The returns to acquirers are highest in the 
acquisition of high free cash flow targets by slack-poor acquirers.  
Furthermore, Harford (1999) examines whether excess cash holdings stimulate top 
management to conduct takeover transactions and whether such deals (made by cash-
rich acquirers) tend to destroy value. The author finds that cash richness is positively 
related to the probability of being an acquirer, but negatively related to acquirer 
announcement returns. Additionally, the post-merger long-term abnormal operating 
performance of both cash-rich and cash-poor acquirers is significantly negative and 
insignificant, respectively. In other words, cash-rich companies tend to conduct value-
destroying takeovers.  
According to the aforementioned literature, CEO overconfidence and acquirer 
financial constraints appear to determine acquirer motivations for retaining top-tier 
investment bankers, which in turn influences acquirer performance. In particular, 
constrained acquirers tend to be less overconfident and therefore making more 
rational acquisition decisions. If they retain top-tier investment bankers, the purpose 
should be to gain superior synergy from the M&A deals. In contrast, unconstrained 
acquirers tend to be more overconfident. They overvalue their firms and overestimate 
their ability to create synergy (identify synergistic targets), and therefore, they retain 
top-tier advisors mostly to complete their intended deals for whatever reasons. Overall, 
we construct the following hypothesis: 
H1: For constrained acquirers only, the retention of top-tier investment bankers is 
positively related to acquirer performance in both the short and long term.  
3. Data and methodology 
3.1. Sample selection 
This paper analyzes a sample of US M&As announced over the January 1990 - 
December 2009 interval from Thomson One Banker. The original sample includes 
178,839 deals. Acquirers are required to be public and targets are required to be public, 
private, or subsidiaries. Using these criteria yields a sample of 97,343 deals. Takeover 
transaction values are required to be greater than or equal to $1 million, yielding a 
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sample of 53,646 deals. Since this research pays attention to both the short- and long-
term performance of acquisitions, deal status data are required to be complete, which 
leads to a sample of 35,263 deals. Regulated industries such as financial and utility 
firms (Standard Industrial Classification codes 6000–6999 and 4900–4999, 
respectively) are excluded, yielding a sample of 25,099 deals. Bankruptcy 
acquisitions, going-private transactions, leveraged buyouts, liquidations, repurchases, 
restructurings, reverse takeovers, and privatizations are excluded from the sample, 
leaving a panel of 22,701 observations. Since this paper focuses on the effects of 
investment bankers, acquirers are required to have their advisor information recorded 
by Thomson One Banker, yielding 5829 deals. To control for deal characteristics, 
observations are required report transaction value and payment method information to 
Thomson One Banker, which leaves a sample of 5078 deals. To calculate short- and 
long-term abnormal returns—using CARs and buy-and-hold abnormal returns 
(BHARs)—acquirers are required to file sufficient stock price data with the Center for 
Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database, which leaves a sample of 4367 deals.3 
To measure firm characteristics, acquirers are required to have sufficient accounting 
data in the Compustat database, yielding a final sample of 2860 deals.4 In the final 
sample, 2771 transactions are advised by investment banks, and 89 transactions are 
in-house deals.  
3.2. Methodology 
Measure of advisor reputation 
Following the method of Golubov et al. (2012), this research uses a binary 
classification to distinguish between top-tier and non–top-tier advisors. Specifically, 
the top 10 banks measured by transaction value are classified as top-tier advisors and 
the others are classified as non-top-tier advisors5. Since the eighth and tenth advisors 
are very similar in transaction values and market shares, this paper uses the top 10 as 
the cut-off point, unlike the top-eight classification of Golubov et al. (2012).  
                                                                
3 Calculating size-adjusted BHARs also requires data on the book value of equity from the Compustat database. 
4 This paper uses the KZ index to measure financial constraints. To calculate the KZ index, COMPUSTAT items 1, 
6, 8, 9, 14, 18, 19, 21, 24, 25, 34, 60, 74, and 216 are required. Item 8 requires the lag value. Consequently, merely 
calculating the KZ index generates 1391 missing values. 
5 Appendix 1 shows the top 25 investment banks ranked by transaction value. Financial advisor league tables were 
downloaded from Thomson One Banker. The ranking lists for the 1990s and 2000s are presented in Panels A and 
B, respectively. 
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To prevent misclassification, this paper also pays attention to takeovers among 
investment banks. For instance, Lehman Brothers declared bankruptcy in 2008 and 
was acquired by Barclays Capital the same year. Therefore, deals advised by Barclays 
Capital before the acquisition of Lehman Brothers (top tier) are classified as being 
advised by a non–top-tier investment bank, whereas deals advised by Barclays Capital 
after the acquisition are classified as advised by a top-tier bank. Similarly, First 
Boston (top tier) was acquired by Credit Suisse in 1990. Travelers Group acquired 
Salomon Brothers (top tier) in 1998 and subsequently merged with Citicorp the same 
year, establishing Citigroup.  
Measure of financial constraint 
This paper uses the Kaplan–Zingales (KZ) index to measure acquirer financial 
constraints. Using a sample of 49 low-dividend firms from 1970 to 1984, Kaplan and 
Zingales (1997) investigate the proper measure of firms’ financial constraints. 
Specifically, they identify constrained and unconstrained firms by analyzing annual 
reports and management discussions. Subsequently, they consider firm characteristics 
(ratio of cash flow to capital, Tobin’s Q, leverage, ratio of dividends to capital, and 
ratio of cash to capital) that relate to financing constraints to estimate an ordered logit 
regression. The parameters of the regression are used to formulate the KZ index, 
thereby measuring a firm’s level of financial constraint (Lamont et al., 2001). A 
higher KZ index indicates a higher level of financial constraint. The KZ index is 
widely used in research to measure firm financial constraints (Baker et al., 2003; 
Malmendier and Tate, 2005, 2008). 
Following the aforementioned research, we calculate the KZ index using the 
following formula: 
𝐾𝑍𝑖𝑡 = −1.001909 ×
𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡
𝐾𝑖𝑡−1
+ 0.2826389 × 𝑄𝑖𝑡 + 3.139193 × 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡
− 39.3678 ×
𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡
𝐾𝑖𝑡−1
− 1.314759 ×
𝐶𝑖𝑡
𝐾𝑖𝑡−1
 
where CFit/Kit-1 is cash flow (Compustat item IB+DP) over lagged capital (Compustat 
item PPENT), Qit is Tobin’s Q ratio (Compustat item (AT+PRCC×CSHO-CEQ-
TXDB)/AT), Leverageit is the leverage ratio (Compustat item 
(DLTT+DLC)/(DLTT+DLC+SEQ)); Divendendit/Kit-1 is dividends (Compustat item 
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DVC+DVP) over lagged capital (Compustat item PPENT), and Cit/Kit-1 is cash 
(Compustat item CHE) over lagged capital (Compustat item PPENT).  
Short-term performance 
Bouwman et al. (2009) argue that the presence of frequent acquirers in the sample 
will bias market model parameter estimations. In line with these authors, this paper 
uses market-adjusted cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) to measure acquirer short-
term performance. Market-adjusted abnormal returns are defined as 
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅𝑚𝑡 
where Rit is the daily stock return for firm i on date t and Rmt is the daily return for the 
value-weighted CRSP index on date t.  
Subsequently, market-adjusted CARs are calculated over a [-2, 2] window around 
announcements (CAR[-2, 2]), as follows: 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑇1,𝑇2 = ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑇2
𝑡=𝑇1
. 
Long-term performance 
Test statistics of long-term market-adjusted abnormal returns are misspecified due to 
rebalancing bias, new-listing bias, and skewness bias (Barber and Lyon, 1997; Lyon 
et al., 1999). To address these problems, Lyon et al. (1999) and Bouwman et al. (2009) 
use size-adjusted buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) to measure long-term 
stock performance. Therefore, this paper calculates post-merger 36-month size-
adjusted BHARs (BHAR36). Specifically, size-adjusted BHARs are calculated as 
follows: 
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑇1,𝑇2 = ∏(1 + 𝑅𝑖𝑡)
𝑇2
𝑡=𝑇1
− ∏(1 + 𝑅𝑝𝑡)
𝑇2
𝑡=𝑇1
 
where Rit is the monthly stock return for firm i in month t and Rpt is the monthly return 
for reference portfolio in month t, calculated as  
𝑅𝑝𝑡 =
1
𝑁
∑ 𝑅𝑗𝑡
𝑁
𝑗=1
 
where Rjt the monthly stock return for firm j in month t and N the number of firms.  
In each year, we construct 50 reference portfolios based on size and market-to-book. 
The reference portfolios are created in two stages, following Bouwman et al. (2009). 
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First, from 1990 to 2009, all NYSE firms are sorted into deciles on the basis of their 
market value, calculated as the stock price multiplied by the number of common 
shares outstanding in June of year t. Second, within each size decile, firms are sorted 
into quintiles based on their market-to-book ratios, calculated as the market value of 
equity in June of year t divided by the book value of equity in fiscal year t - 1. After 
all NYSE firms are categorized into 50 groups, AMEX and NASDAQ firms are 
placed in their proper reference portfolios based on market value and market-to-book 
ratios. Additionally, firms that conducted acquisitions in year t are excluded from the 
reference portfolios.  
Multivariate analysis 
The variation in acquirer abnormal returns can be explained by multiple variables. 
Since univariate tests do not consider the interaction of alternative variables, the 
results may be unreliable. Therefore, multivariate regressions are necessary6 . We 
divide acquirers into three groups based on their KZ index. Specifically, the lowest 
(highest) third of acquirers ranked by KZ index is defined as unconstrained 
(constrained). The middle third of acquirers is classified as the neutral group. For each 
group, the following equations (1) and (2) are employed to examine the relation 
between acquirer abnormal returns and investment bankers: 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑇𝑜𝑝𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟𝑖 + 𝛼2𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖 + 𝛼3𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑖 + 𝛼4𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑖 + 𝑓𝑡 + 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑑. + 𝜀𝑖    (1) 
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑇𝑜𝑝𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟𝑖 + 𝛼2𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖 + 𝛼3𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑖 + 𝛼4𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑖 + 𝑓𝑡 + 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑑. + 𝜀𝑖  (2) 
where TopTieri is the key explanatory variable in this research and equals one if 
acquirer i retains a top-tier advisor for the deal. Firmi represents the firm 
characteristics of acquirer i at the end of fiscal year prior to the announcement, 
including pre-deal stock performance (RUNUP), size (LN(MV)), market-to-book ratio 
(M/B), price-to-earnings ratio (P/E), leverage (Leverage), return on equity (ROE), 
cash flow-to-equity ratio (Cash flows/Equity), and acquirer takeover experience 
(Experienced Bidder). Deali represents the deal characteristics for acquirer i, 
including relative transaction values (Relative Size), target public status (Public), 
payment method (Cash/Stock), deal attitude (Hostile), bid competition (Competing 
Bid), tender offers (Tender), and diversifying deals (Diversification). Marketi 
                                                                
6 All the control variables mentioned in this section are described in Appendix 2, where Panels A to C present firm 
characteristics, deal characteristics, and market characteristics, respectively. 
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represents market characteristics for acquirer i, including M&A market heat (M&A 
Heat Degree) and stock market valuation (High/Low Valuation Market).  
Equations (1) and (2) also control for year fixed effects (ft) and industry fixed effects 
(find.). To minimize the influence of outliers, all continuous variables are winsorized at 
3% and 97%.7 
In addition, this paper also investigates whether constrained acquirers tend to conduct 
in-house deals or retain top-tier advisors. The following probit models (equations (3) 
and (4)) are employed to examine whether acquirer financial constraint is a key 
determinant of decisions on in-house deals and the retention of top-tier advisors, 
respectively: 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑛 − ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒 𝑑𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐾𝑍𝑖 + 𝛼2𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖 + 𝛼3𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑖 +
𝛼4𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑖 + 𝑓𝑡 + 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑑. + 𝜀𝑖     (3) 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑟 𝑎𝑑𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐾𝑍𝑖 + 𝛼2𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖 +
𝛼3𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑖 + 𝛼4𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑖 + 𝑓𝑡 + 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑑. + 𝜀𝑖     (4) 
where KZi represents the KZ index of acquirer i at the end of fiscal year prior to the 
announcement. Other variables are explained above. 
 
3.3. Summary statistics 
Table 1 exhibits summary statistics for the entire sample. In our sample, 48.74% and 
48.15% of deals are advised by top-tier and non–top-tier advisors, respectively. In-
house deals account for only 3.11% of the sample.  
Insert Table 1 Here 
 
Panel A of Table 1 shows both short- and long-term abnormal returns for acquirers. 
For the full sample, acquirers’ CAR [-2, 2] and BHAR36 average 1.24% and -37.87%, 
respectively. Deals advised by top-tier advisors generate significantly lower short-
                                                                
7 Results hold when the variables are winsorized at different levels, such as 1% and 99%, 2% and 98%, and 5% 
and 95%. 
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term returns but significantly higher long-term returns for acquirers than deals advised 
by non–top-tier advisors.  
Panel B of Table 1 presents statistics for firm characteristics. The KZ index for 
acquirers averages -9.2557 over the sample period (1990–2009). Additionally, 
acquirers who retain top-tier advisors have a higher KZ index than acquirers who 
retain non–top-tier advisors (-7.9906 versus -10.9005), indicating that relatively more 
constrained acquires tend to choose top-tier advisors.  
Furthermore, compared with acquirers advised by non-top-tier advisors, acquirers 
who retain top-tier advisors have a significantly lower RUNUP value, higher market 
value, market-to-book ratio, price-to-earnings ratio, leverage ratio, ROE ratio, and 
cash flows-to-equity ratio, indicating that acquirers who retain top-tier advisors tend 
to be firms with lower stock performance (but still better than the market index), large 
firms, glamour firms, firms with higher leverage, and firms with better operating 
performance. Additionally, compared with non-top-tier advisors, top-tier advisors 
associate with more percentage of experienced acquirers. 
Panel C shows the deal characteristics. Top-tier advisors are significantly associated 
with larger deals (in terms of transaction value), more public acquisitions, fewer all-
stock deals, more all-cash deals, more hostile deals, more competing bids, and more 
tender offers. In addition, top-tier advisors take more time to complete deals and help 
their clients pay fewer bid premiums but charge higher advisory fees.  
Panel D presents the market characteristics. The term M&A Heat Degree is 
significantly negatively related to the retention of top-tier advisors, indicating that 
acquirers in a relatively cold M&A market tend to choose top-tier advisors. In 
addition, acquirers are more likely to choose top-tier advisors when stock market 
valuations are high or low.  
4. Empirical results 
4.1. Univariate analysis 
Short-term performance 
Table 2 reports the short-term performance (CAR [-2, 2]) for different advisor–
constraint groups and their univariate comparison. 
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Insert Table 2 Here 
 
Panel A of Table 2 shows the announcement abnormal returns for the full sample. 
Constrained acquirers exhibit a significantly positive short-term outperformance of 
1.35% (p = 0.001) over unconstrained acquirers. This result is consistent with the free 
cash flow hypothesis that cash-rich acquirers tend to conduct value-destroying 
takeovers.  
Panel B of Table 2 shows that deals advised by top-tier advisors gain significantly 
positive announcement abnormal returns for constrained and neutral acquirers, but 
insignificant abnormal returns for unconstrained acquirers. For deals advised by top-
tier advisors, constrained acquirers significantly outperform unconstrained acquirers 
by 2.41% (p = 0.000).  
Panels C and D of Table 2 represent the announcement abnormal returns for acquirers 
advised by non–top-tier advisors and in in-house deals, respectively. In both in-house 
deals and deals advised by non–top-tier advisors, the differences in abnormal returns 
between unconstrained and constrained acquirers are insignificant. These results 
indicate that constrained acquirers do not outperform unconstrained acquirers without 
the services of top-tier advisors. In other words, if the free cash flow hypothesis can 
explain all the variation in acquirer short-term performance, constraint acquirers 
should also outperform unconstrained acquirers in deals advised by non–top-tier 
advisors and in-house deals. Our results suggest that top-tier advisors play a pivotal 
role in helping constrained acquirers gain superior performance.  
Panel E shows the differences in acquirer announcement abnormal returns between 
deals advised by top-tier and non–top-tier advisors. For the full sample, acquirers 
advised by top-tier advisors underperform non–top-tier advisors by 0.75% (p = 0.025). 
This result can be mainly attributed to unconstrained acquirers. Specifically, 
unconstrained acquirers advised by top-tier advisors significantly underperform 
unconstrained acquirers advised by non–top-tier advisors by 1.86% (p = 0.002). In 
contrast, constrained acquirers advised by top-tier advisors insignificantly outperform 
constrained acquirers advised by non–top-tier advisors. For deals advised by 
investment banks, constraint acquirers advised by top-tier advisors gain the highest 
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short-term abnormal returns (2.07%, p =0.000). These results suggest that constrained 
acquirers retain top-tier advisors to chase performance, whereas unconstrained 
acquirers retain top-tier advisors to complete deals.  
Long-term performance 
Table 3 reports the long-term performance (BHAR36) for different constraint–advisor 
groups and their univariate comparison. 
 
Insert Table 3 Here 
 
Panels A to D represent acquirer long-term size-adjusted BHARs for the full sample, 
deals advised by top-tier advisors, deals advised by non–top-tier advisors, and in-
house deals, respectively. Consistent with previous research (Bouwman et al., 2009), 
long-term abnormal returns are significantly negative for each constraint–advisor 
group (except for the neutral in-house group, where BHAR36 is insignificantly 
negative). For the full sample, constrained acquirers significantly outperform 
unconstrained acquirers by 13.12% (p = 0.000). Similarly, for deals advised by top-
tier and non–top-tier advisors, constrained acquirers significantly outperform 
unconstrained acquirers by 12.52% (p = 0.011) and 12.48% (p = 0.015), respectively. 
The results concur with the free cash flow hypothesis. However, for in-house deals, 
the performance differences between constrained and unconstrained acquirers are 
insignificant.  
Panel E shows the differences in long-term performance between deals advised by 
top-tier and non–top-tier advisors. For the full sample, acquirers advised by top-tier 
advisors experience a significant, positive long-term outperformance of 15.16% (p = 
0.000) over acquirers advised by non–top-tier advisors. In addition, acquirers advised 
by top-tier advisors outperform acquirers advised by non–top-tier advisors by 17.25% 
(p = 0.001), 10.02% (p = 0.023), and 17.22% (p = 0.001) in the constrained, neutral, 
and unconstrained sub-groups, respectively. These results support the superior deal 
hypothesis, in that top-tier advisors are hired to gain better performance.  
Time to resolution, bid premiums, and advisory fees 
Table 4 reports the time to resolution for different constraint–advisor groups and their 
univariate comparison. Time to resolution is measured as the number of days between 
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the announcement and effective dates. Compared with unconstrained acquirers, 
constrained acquirers use 26.66 (p = 0.000) more days to complete deals, on average. 
In addition, in deals advised by top-tier advisors and deals advised by non-top-tier 
advisors, the time to resolution is significantly longer for constrained acquirers than 
unconstrained acquirers. These results suggest that constrained acquirers are more 
careful in conducting takeovers. However, for in-house deals, the differences between 
constrained and unconstrained acquirers are insignificant. Furthermore, acquirers 
advised by top-tier advisors take 15.81 more days to complete deals than acquirers 
advised by non–top-tier advisors. Similarly, for all three different constraint groups, 
time to resolution is significantly higher for acquirers advised by top-tier advisors. If 
top-tier advisors have superior skills, they can take less time to complete deals. 
However, they take longer, suggesting that they work diligently.  
 
Insert Table 4 Here 
 
Table 5 shows the bid premiums for different constraint–advisor groups and their 
univariate comparison. Bid premiums, obtained from Thomson One Banker, are 
calculated as the difference between the deal price and the target’s stock price four 
weeks prior to the announcement divided by the target’s stock price four weeks prior 
to the announcement. If acquirers have higher bargaining power, they will pay lower 
bid premiums. For the full sample, constrained acquirers pay significantly lower 
premiums than unconstrained acquirers, indicating that constrained acquirers care 
more about takeover performance than unconstrained acquirers do. In addition, 
acquirers advised by top-tier advisors pay significantly lower bid premiums than 
acquirers advised by non-top-tier advisors do, which suggests that top-tier advisors 
help their clients gain more bargaining power in the negotiation process and 
ultimately obtain better acquisition performance. In particular, for deals with advisor 
involvement, constrained acquirers advised by top-tier advisors pay the lowest bid 
premium (36.99%), whereas neutral acquirers advised by non–top-tier advisors pay 
the highest bid premium (47.04%). 
 
Insert Table 5 Here 
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Table 6 shows the acquirer advisory fees for different constraint–advisor groups and 
their univariate comparison. Top-tier advisors charge significantly higher advisory 
fees than non–top-tier advisors in the full sample and all three different constraint 
sub-samples. However, the differences in advisory fees between constraint and 
unconstrained acquirers are insignificant for the full sample and the two different 
advisor sub-samples. In particular, unconstrained acquirers advised by top-tier 
advisors pay the highest advisory fees, whereas constrained acquirers advised by non–
top-tier advisors pay the lowest advisory fees. Overpayment leads to negative market 
reactions. 
 
Insert Table 6 Here 
 
Overall, unconstrained acquirers who retain top-tier advisors pay the highest advisory 
fees. However, premium advisory fees do not translate into stronger bargaining power. 
In deals advised by banks, unconstrained acquirers advised by top-tier advisors do not 
pay lower bid premiums than other acquirers. In contrast, constrained acquirers 
advised by top-tier advisors pay the lowest bid premiums, indicating that they gain 
more shares of synergy. All these results suggest that unconstrained acquirers care less 
about performance compared to constrained acquirers. In other words, unconstrained 
acquirers do not chase performance. Since unconstrained acquirers tend to be 
overconfident (Malmendier and Tate, 2008), these results are consistent with Hayward 
and Hambrick (1997) and Hietala et al. (2003) that overconfident acquirers suffer 
from overpayment. 
4.2. Multivariate analysis 
We conduct multivariate regressions to further address the research question. Our 
analysis proceeds in two steps. Firstly, we are interested in determining whether 
relatively constrained acquirers tend to employ top-tier advisors and secondly, we 
conduct regressions of short- and long-term abnormal returns on top-tier advisors for 
deals advised by investment banks.  
Probability of retaining top-tier advisors 
Table 7 presents the estimation results of the probit model. Specifications 1 and 2 
estimate the impact of financial constraints on the probability of conducting in-house 
 17 
deals (versus retaining advisors) and the probability of retaining top-tier advisors 
(versus retaining non-top-tier advisors), respectively. 
 
Insert Table 7 Here 
 
For the probit model of in-house deals, the KZ index is significantly positive, 
indicating that more constrained advisors tend to conduct in-house deals. Furthermore, 
RUNUP, LN(MV), and Relative Size are significantly negative, while M/B, Public, 
Heat Degree, and High Valuation Market are positive and significant. These results 
suggest that a firm tends to conduct in-house deals when it has poorer stock 
performance before acquisition, smaller size, or a higher market-to-book ratio; when 
the target is relatively smaller or publicly listed; when the M&A market is hot; or 
when the stock’s market valuation is high.  
For the probit model of the retention of top-tier advisors, the KZ index is insignificant, 
indicating that financial constraints are not a determinant of the retention of top-tier 
advisors. In addition, RUNUP, ROE, Stock, and Heat Degree are significantly 
negative, while LN(MV), Cash Flows/Equity, Relative Size, and Public are 
significantly positive. These results indicate that top-tier advisors are retained when 
the acquirer has poorer stock performance before acquisition, larger size, a lower 
ROE, or more free cash flows; when the target is relatively larger or is publicly listed; 
or when the M&A market is relatively cold.  
Overall, more constrained acquirers tend to conduct in-house deals but do not have a 
strong preference for retaining top-tier advisors. These results suggest that constrained 
acquirers are rational in terms of retaining investment bankers.  
Short-term performance 
Table 8 shows the results of the short-term multivariate analysis. Specifications 1 to 4 
represent the regression of CAR [-2, 2] on top-tier advisors for all acquirers and for 
constrained, neutral, and unconstrained acquirers, respectively. 
 
Insert Table 8 Here 
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The Top-Tier dummy, the key explanatory variable of this paper, is significantly 
positive in specification 2, but insignificant in specifications 1, 3, and 4. The 
magnitude of the coefficient of Top-Tier dummy is also much smaller in these 
specifications. In specification 4, the coefficient of Top-Tier dummy is even negative. 
In other words, only for constrained acquirers, top-tier advisors have significantly 
more positive effects than non-top-tier advisors. For constrained acquirers, retaining 
top-tier advisors can help improve announcement abnormal returns by 1.17%. 
However, for unconstrained and neutral acquirers, retaining top-tier advisors does not 
enhance announcement performance. These results are consistent with the univariate 
analysis, suggesting that constrained advisors retain top-tier advisors to pursue 
superior performance, whereas unconstrained acquirers pay more attention to deal 
completion.  
Furthermore, the variable LN(MV) is significantly negative in all specifications, 
suggesting that larger firms tend to gain lower announcement returns. The variable 
M/B is significantly negative in specification 2 and P/E is significantly negative in 
specification 3, indicating that overvalued acquirers underperform in the short term. 
The Experienced Bidder dummy is significantly negative in specification 2, 
suggesting that more experienced acquirers gain lower announcement returns. The 
variable Relative Size is significantly positive in specification 1, indicating that larger 
deals create more announcement returns for acquirers. The Public dummy is 
significantly negative in all specifications, implying that public acquisitions 
underperform private and subsidiary acquisitions around announcements. The Cash 
dummy is significantly positive in specifications 1 to 3, suggesting that cash deals 
have better announcement performance. The Competing Bid dummy is significantly 
negative in specifications 1 and 2, indicating that takeover contests have a detrimental 
influence on acquirer announcement returns. The Tender Offer dummy is significantly 
positive in all specifications, implying that tender offers are associated with better 
short-term performance. These results are consistent with those in the literature.  
Long-term performance 
Table 9 shows the results of the long-term multivariate analysis. Specifications 1 to 4 
represent the regression of BHAR36 on top-tier advisors for all acquirers and 
constrained, neutral, and unconstrained acquirers, respectively. 
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Insert Table 9 Here 
 
The coefficient of the Top-Tier dummy is positive for specification 1 (regression for 
the full sample). This result is driven by the constrained acquirer sub-sample. More 
specifically, the Top-Tier dummy is significantly positive in specification 2 but 
insignificant for specifications 3 and 4. In other words, top-tier advisors help 
constrained acquirers gain significantly higher long-term abnormal returns, but do not 
significantly improve performance for unconstrained and neutral acquirers. The 
magnitude of the coefficient of Top-Tier dummy is largest for constrained acquirers. 
Acquirers who retain top-tier advisors gain 13.67% higher long-term BHARs. These 
results concur with the univariate analysis. Overall, the long-term analysis also 
implies that top-tier advisors are retained by constrained acquirers to chase 
performance but are retained by unconstrained acquirers to complete deals.  
Additionally, variable RUNUP is significantly negative in specifications 1 to 3, 
indicating that firms that have higher stock returns prior to announcements do not 
maintain their performance during the post-merger period. The term LN(MV) is 
significantly negative in specification 2, indicating that larger acquirers underperform 
in the long term. The variable M/B is significantly negative in specifications 1 to 3, 
suggesting that glamour acquirers underperform in the long term. The variable 
Leverage is significantly positive in specifications 1 and 2, implying that debt helps 
alleviate conflicts of interest and therefore improves acquirer long-term performance. 
The term Cash Flows/Equity is significantly positive in specifications 1 to 3, 
indicating that acquirers who have better operating performance before acquisitions 
tend to gain higher long-term returns. The variable Relative Size is significantly 
positive in specification 4, suggesting that acquisitions of relatively larger targets 
generate higher long-term returns for acquirers. The variable Public is significantly 
positive in specification 2, indicating that public acquisitions create value in the long 
term. The term Cash is significantly positive in specifications 1 and 4, suggesting that 
all-cash deals outperform stock deals. The variable Hostile is significantly positive in 
specifications 1 and 2, indicating that hostile deals are associated with better long-
term performance. The High (Low) Valuation Market dummy is significantly positive 
(negative) in specification 4, suggesting that acquisitions conducted in a “bull” market 
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gain higher long-term returns than those conducted in a “bear” market. Generally, 
these results are consistent with the existing literature.  
5. Robustness test 
This section addresses the robustness of our results.8  
Measure of financial constraint 
To examine whether our results are sensitive to the measure of financial constraint, we 
also use the SA index (Hadlock and Pierce, 2010) to classify financial constraints of 
firms. Hadlock and Pierce (2010) argue that firm size and age are the reliable indictors 
of financial constraints and introduce the SA index. Following Hadlock and Pierce 
(2010), we calculate the SA index using the following formula: 
SA = (−0.737 × Size) + (0.043 × Size2) − (0.040 × Age) 
where Size is the natural logarithm of total assets (inflation adjusted to 2004), and 
Age is the number of years the firm is listed on Compustat. When the SA index is 
calculated, Size is winsorized at (the log of) $4.5 billion, and Age is winsorized at 37 
years. 
Table 10 shows the regression of the long-term performance, where the SA index is 
used to measure financial constraint. Specifications 1 to 4 represent the regression of 
BHAR36 on top-tier advisors for all acquirers, constrained acquirers, neutral acquirers, 
and unconstrained acquirers, respectively. 
 
Insert Table 10 Here 
 
The results indicate that top-tier advisors significantly improve performance for 
constrained and neutral acquirers in the long term, whereas unconstrained acquirers 
advised by top-tier advisors do not outperform unconstrained acquirers advised by 
non–top-tier advisors. The magnitude of the coefficient of Top-Tier dummy is larger 
for constrained acquirers, compared to neutral acquirers. These results are consistent 
with the results of regressions using the KZ index as a measure of financial constraint.  
Short-term performance 
                                                                
8 This paper does not tabulate all the robustness results for brevity; however, the results are available upon request. 
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We use alternative event windows and valuation models to measure acquirer short-
term performance. Specifically, we calculate CARs over the [-1, 1] and [-5, 5] 
windows. In addition, we apply the market model, the Fama-French three-factor 
model, and the Fama-French-momentum four-factor model to compute announcement 
abnormal returns. The results are not sensitive to these variations.  
Long-term performance 
We also use alternative event windows and valuation models to measure acquirer 
long-term performance. Specifically, we calculate BHARs over 12-month and 24-
month windows. In addition, we calculate market-adjusted BHARs. For size-adjusted 
BHARs, we also use following alternative formula: 
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑇1,𝑇2 = ∏(1 + 𝑅𝑖𝑡)
𝑇2
𝑡=𝑇1
− 1 − 𝑅𝑝𝑡 
where Rit is the monthly stock return for firm i in month t and Rpt is the monthly buy-
and-hold return for the reference portfolio in month t, calculated as  
𝑅𝑝𝑡 = ∑
∏ (1 + 𝑅𝑗𝑡)
𝑇2
𝑡=𝑇1 − 1
𝑛
𝑛
𝑗=1
 
with Rjt the monthly stock return for firm j in month t and n the number of firms.  
the results are robust to these variations.  
Financial advisor classification 
We evaluate whether our results are sensitive to different financial advisor 
classifications. Specifically, we follow the method of Golubov et al. (2012), using the 
top-eight cut-off point. The results are robust to this classification.  
6. Conclusions 
This paper examines whether top-tier investment bankers can help acquirers gain 
superior takeover performance, controlling for firm financial conditions. Our probit 
models suggest that relatively constrained acquirers are more likely to conduct in-
house deals but do not chase top-tier advisors, exhibiting rational behavior. In line 
with Malmendier and Tate (2008) that financially unconstrained acquirers tend to be 
overconfident and therefore make value-decreasing takeovers, this paper show that 
the retention of top-tier advisors improves acquirer performance, but only for 
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constrained acquirers. Specifically, in the short term, retaining top-tier advisors can 
help constrained acquirers improve announcement abnormal returns by 1.17%, after 
controlling for firm, deal, and market characteristics. However, the retention of top-
tier advisors does not improve short-term performance for unconstrained and neutral 
acquirers. In the long term, top-tier advisors are positively related to acquirer 
performance. The result is driven by the sub-sample of constrained acquirers. For 
constrained acquirers, the retention of top-tier advisors improves long-term 
performance by 13.67%, after firm, deal, and market characteristics are controlled for. 
In contrast, the effects of top-tier advisors are insignificant for unconstrained and 
neutral acquirers. Therefore, the results indicate that top-tier advisors do create value 
for relatively constrained acquirers in both the short and long term. 
The results for time to resolution, bid premiums, and advisory fees can help explain 
the variation in acquirer performance. Whether acquirers are constrained or 
unconstrained, top-tier advisors take longer to help their clients complete deals, 
suggesting that top-tier advisors are diligent. Meanwhile, top-tier advisors charge 
about three times higher advisory fees than non-top-tier advisors, on average. In 
particular, unconstrained advisors who retain top-tier advisors pay the highest 
advisory fees. If unconstrained acquirers are rational and chase performance, they 
should expect to gain higher bargaining power and therefore pay lower bid premiums. 
However, the highest advisory fees do not translate into greater bargaining power in 
the negotiation process. Unconstrained acquirers advised by top-tier advisors pay 
higher bid premiums, while constrained acquirers advised by top-tier advisors pay the 
lowest bid premiums. These results indicate that constrained acquirers who retain top-
tier advisors gain greater bargaining power, while unconstrained acquirers care less 
about overpayment and takeover performance. These results are consistent with 
overconfidence hypothesis that overconfident CEOs overestimate their ability to 
achieve synergy (Roll, 1986; Doukas and Petmezas, 2007; Malmendier and Tate, 2008; 
Croci et al., 2010) and overpay takeover targets, leading to negative market reactions. 
Overall, our results suggest that different acquirers have different aims. Constrained 
acquirers retain top-tier advisors to gain superior performance, while unconstrained 
acquirers retain top-tier advisors to complete their intended deals.   
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
 
This table presents summary statistics for the full sample. The top-tier, non-top-tier and in-house subsamples contain deals advised by top-tier advisors, deals 
advised by non-top-tier advisors and in-house deals, respectively. Panel A reports acquirer short- and long-term abnormal returns. CAR [-2, 2] is the 5-day 
market-adjusted cumulative abnormal returns around announcement. BHAR36 is the post-merger 36-month size-adjusted buy-and-hold abnormal returns. 
Panel B reports financial advisor status. In-House dummy equals one if there is no advisor retained for the acquisition. Top-Tier dummy equals one if a top-
tier advisor is retained by an acquirer. Panel C reports acquirer firm characteristics. KZ Index is Kaplan and Zingales Index measured at the fiscal year end 
before the announcement. RUNUP is measured as market-adjusted CARs over the [-365, -28] window prior to announcement. MV is market value of equity 
measured 4 weeks before the announcement. M/B is measured as market value of equity 4 weeks before the announcement divided by book value of equity at 
the fiscal year end before the announcement. P/E is measured as share price over earnings per share at the fiscal year end before the announcement. Leverage 
is measured as total debt over total capital at the fiscal year end before the announcement. ROE is measured as net income over shareholders’ equity at the 
fiscal year end before the announcement. Cash Flows/Equity is measured as cash flows at the fiscal year end before the announcement divided by market 
value of equity 4 weeks before the announcement. Experienced Bidder dummy equals one if the acquirer has conducted 3 or more M&A deals over the five 
years period before the acquisition in question. Panel D reports deal characteristics. Transaction Value is the value of the deal. Relative Size is measured as 
the transaction value divided by the acquirer market value of equity 4 weeks before the announcement. Public dummy equals one if the target is publicly 
listed. Stock dummy equals one if the deal is 100% paid by stock. Cash dummy equals one if the deal is 100% paid by cash. Mixed dummy equals one if the 
deal is partially paid by stock and partially paid by cash. Hostile dummy equals one if the deal is identified as hostile or unsolicited by Thomson One Banker. 
Competing Bid dummy equals one if the number of bidding firms is more than one. Tender Offer dummy equals one if the deal is a tender offer. 
Diversification dummy equals one if the acquirer and the target have different first two-digit of primary SIC code. Time to resolution is measured as the 
number of days between announcement and effective date. Bid premium, obtained from Thomson One Banker, is calculated as the difference between the 
deal price and the target’s stock price 4 weeks prior to the announcement divided by the target’s stock price 4 weeks prior to the announcement. Acquirer 
advisory fees are obtained from Thomson One Banker. Panel E reports market characteristics. M&A Heat Degree is measured as the moving average of the 
number of M&A deals in each quarter divided by the historical average of the number of M&A deals in all previous quarters going back to 1985. High 
Valuation Market dummy equals one if a deal is conducted during the period of high valuation market. Low Valuation Market equals one if a deal is 
conducted during the period of low valuation market. For the full sample, all continuous variables are winsorized at the 3% and 97% levels. 
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All 
(A) 
Top-Tier 
(T) 
Non-Top-Tier 
(N) 
In-House 
(I) 
Difference 
(T) – (N) 
Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean P-Value 
Panel A: Short- and Long-term Abnormal Returns 
CAR[-2,2] 1.24% 2860 0.85% 1394 1.60% 1377 1.73% 89 -0.75%** (0.025) 
BHAR36 -37.87% 2860 -30.52% 1394 -45.67% 1377 -32.38% 89 15.16%*** (0.000) 
Panel B: Firm Characteristics 
KZ Index -9.2557  2860 -7.9906  1394 -10.9005  1377 -3.6207  89 2.9099***  (0.000) 
RUNUP 18.78% 2860 16.81% 1394 21.04% 1377 14.54% 89 -4.22%** (0.014) 
MV 7167.1830  2860 11069.7200  1394 2373.9750  1377 20202.0500  89 8695.7490***  (0.000) 
M/B 4.7578  2860 4.8769  1394 4.4789  1377 7.2077  89 0.3980**  (0.038) 
P/E 19.4932  2860 20.9607  1394 17.1087  1377 33.3998  89 3.8520**  (0.027) 
Leverage 0.2710  2860 0.3042  1394 0.2385  1377 0.2534  89 0.0657***  (0.000) 
ROE 0.0584  2860 0.0936  1394 0.0195  1377 0.1083  89 0.0741***  (0.000) 
Cash Flows/Equity 0.0511  2860 0.0592  1394 0.0121  1377 0.0376  89 0.0471***  (0.001) 
Experienced Bidder 65.17% 2860 74.39% 1394 54.61% 1377 84.27% 89 19.78%*** (0.000) 
Panel C: Deal Characteristics 
Transaction Value ($ mil.) 576.3090  2860 916.0940  1394 243.0269  1377 410.7923  89 673.0671***  (0.000) 
Relative Size 0.3098  2860 0.3072  1394 0.3269  1377 0.0841  89 -0.0197  (0.166) 
Public 46.54% 2860 53.80% 1394 36.67% 1377 85.39% 89 17.13%*** (0.000) 
All-Stock Deals 26.75% 2860 21.16% 1394 30.86% 1377 50.56% 89 -9.70%*** (0.000) 
All-Cash Deals 35.80% 2860 40.39% 1394 31.45% 1377 31.46% 89 8.94%*** (0.000) 
Hostile 1.12% 2860 1.94% 1394 0.36% 1377 0.00% 89 1.57%*** (0.000) 
Competing Bid 1.96% 2860 2.80% 1394 1.09% 1377 2.25% 89 1.71%*** (0.001) 
Tender Offer 16.26% 2860 20.09% 1394 12.20% 1377 19.10% 89 7.89%*** (0.000) 
Diversification 
Time-to-Resolution (days) 
Bid Premium 
Advisory Fees ($ mil.) 
34.72% 
83.3601 
41.84% 
3.6802 
2860 
2860 
1219 
483 
34.65% 
90.4017 
39.79% 
5.5529 
1394 
1394 
706 
236 
34.42% 
74.5933 
43.29% 
1.8910 
1377 
1377 
445 
247 
40.45% 
108.7079 
53.62% 
- 
89 
89 
68 
- 
0.23% 
15.8084*** 
-3.50%* 
3.6619*** 
(0.901) 
 (0.000) 
(0.100) 
(0.000) 
Panel D: Market Characteristics 
M&A Heat Degree 1.4778  2860 1.4382  1394 1.4958  1377 1.8182  89 -0.0576***  (0.000) 
High Valuation Market 28.08% 2860 28.62% 1394 25.42% 1377 60.67% 89 3.21%* (0.058) 
Low Valuation Market 25.14% 2860 28.77% 1394 22.88% 1377 3.37% 89 5.89%*** (0.000) 
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Table 2: Acquirer Short-Term Performance 
 
This table reports acquirer short-term 5 day market-adjusted cumulative abnormal returns 
around the announcement for the full sample. We measure the market-adjusted CARs using 
the formula 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑇1,𝑇2 = ∑ (𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅𝑚𝑡)
𝑇2
𝑡=𝑇1
. Acquirers are divided into three groups based on 
KZ Index. Specifically, the lowest (highest) one third of acquirers ranked by their KZ Index 
are defined as unconstrained (constrained) acquirers. The middle one third of acquirers are 
sorted into the neutral group. Panel A relates to all deals in the sample. Panel B relates to 
deals advised by top-tier advisors. Panel C relates to deals advised by non-top-tier advisors. 
Panel D relates to in-house deals. Panel E relates to difference in acquirer performance 
between deals advised by top-tier and non-top-tier advisors. The variable (CAR) is winsorized 
at the 3% and 97% levels. The P-Value calculated using the t-test is shown in parentheses. 
Statistical significance at the 1% level, 5% level and 10% levels is denoted ***, ** and * 
respectively. 
 
 
 
All 
(A) 
Constrained 
(C) 
Neutral 
(N) 
Unconstrained 
(U) 
Difference 
(C) – (U) 
Panel A: All 
Mean 
P-Value 
N 
1.24%*** 
(0.000) 
2860 
2.00%*** 
(0.000) 
954 
1.06%*** 
(0.000) 
953 
0.65%** 
(0.031) 
953 
1.35%*** 
(0.001) 
 
Panel B: Top-Tier 
Mean 
P-Value 
N 
0.85%*** 
(0.000) 
1394 
2.07%*** 
(0.000) 
460 
0.75%*** 
(0.018) 
505 
-0.34% 
(0.146) 
429 
2.41%*** 
(0.000) 
 
Panel C: Non-Top-Tier 
Mean 
P-Value 
N 
1.60%*** 
(0.000) 
1377 
2.00%*** 
(0.000) 
455 
1.26%*** 
(0.003) 
421 
1.52%*** 
(0.001) 
501 
0.48% 
(0.447) 
 
Panel D: In-House 
Mean 
P-Value 
N 
1.73%** 
(0.027) 
89 
1.22% 
(0.354) 
39 
3.77%*** 
(0.005) 
27 
0.17% 
(0.897) 
23 
1.05% 
(0.571) 
 
Panel E: Difference (Panel B – Panel C) 
Difference 
P-Value 
-0.75%** 
(0.025) 
0.07% 
(0.910) 
-0.51% 
(0.339) 
-1.86%*** 
(0.002) 
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Table 3: Acquirer Long-Term Performance 
 
This table reports the acquirer long-term 36 month size-adjusted buy-and-hold abnormal 
returns from the announcement for the full sample. We measure the size-adjusted BHARs 
using the formula 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑇1,𝑇2 = ∏ (1 + 𝑅𝑖𝑡)
𝑇2
𝑡=𝑇1
− ∏ (1 + 𝑅𝑝𝑡)
𝑇2
𝑡=𝑇1
. Acquirers are divided 
into three groups based on KZ Index. Specifically, the lowest (highest) one third of acquirers 
ranked by their KZ Index are defined as unconstrained (constrained) acquirers. The middle 
one third of acquirers are sorted into the neutral group. Panel A relates to all deals in the 
sample. Panel B relates to deals advised by top-tier advisors. Panel C relates to deals advised 
by non-top-tier advisors. Panel D relates to in-house deals. Panel E relates to difference in 
acquirer performance between deals advised by top-tier and non-top-tier advisors. The 
variable (BHAR) is winsorized at the 3% and 97% levels. The P-Value is shown in 
parentheses and is calculated using the bootstrapping method for BHARs and the t-test for the 
difference between sub-samples.  Statistical significance at the 1% level, 5% level and 10% 
levels is denoted ***, ** and * respectively. 
 
 
All 
(A) 
Constrained 
(C) 
Neutral 
(N) 
Unconstrained 
(U) 
Difference 
(C) – (U) 
Panel A: All 
Mean 
P-Value 
N 
-37.87%*** 
(0.000) 
2860 
-31.63%*** 
(0.000) 
954 
-37.26%*** 
(0.000) 
953 
-44.75%*** 
(0.000) 
953 
13.12%*** 
(0.000) 
 
Panel B: Top-Tier 
Mean 
P-Value 
N 
-30.25%*** 
(0.000) 
1394 
-22.98%*** 
(0.001) 
460 
-33.15%*** 
(0.000) 
505 
-35.50%*** 
(0.001) 
429 
12.52%** 
(0.011) 
 
Panel C: Non-Top-Tier 
Mean 
P-Value 
N 
-45.67%*** 
(0.000) 
1377 
-40.24%*** 
(0.000) 
455 
-43.17%*** 
(0.000) 
421 
-52.72%*** 
(0.000) 
501 
12.48%** 
(0.015) 
 
Panel D: In-House 
Mean 
P-Value 
N 
-32.38%*** 
(0.001) 
89 
-33.07%** 
(0.038) 
39 
-21.86% 
(0.230) 
27 
-43.55%*** 
(0.005) 
23 
10.49% 
(0.567) 
 
Panel E: Difference (Panel B – Panel C) 
Difference 
P-Value 
15.16%*** 
(0.000) 
17.25%*** 
(0.001) 
10.02%** 
(0.023) 
17.22%*** 
(0.001) 
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Table 4: Time to Resolution 
 
This table reports time to resolution for the full sample. Time to resolution is measured as the 
number of days between announcement and effective date. Acquirers are divided into three 
groups based on KZ Index. Specifically, the lowest (highest) one third of acquirers ranked by 
their KZ Index are defined as unconstrained (constrained) acquirers. The middle one third of 
acquirers are sorted into the neutral group. Panel A relates to all deals in the sample. Panel B 
relates to deals advised by top-tier advisors. Panel C relates to deals advised by non-top-tier 
advisors. Panel D relates to in-house deals. Panel E relates to difference in acquirer 
performance between deals advised by top-tier and non-top-tier advisors. The variable (Time 
to Resolution) is winsorized at the 3% and 97% levels. The P-Value is shown in parentheses 
and is calculated using the t-test for the difference between sub-samples. Statistical 
significance at the 1% level, 5% level and 10% levels is denoted ***, ** and * respectively. 
 
 
All 
(A) 
Constrained 
(C) 
Neutral 
(N) 
Unconstrained 
(U) 
Difference 
(C) – (U) 
Panel A: All 
Mean 
P-Value 
N 
83.36 
- 
2860 
96.94 
- 
954 
82.84 
- 
953 
70.29 
- 
953 
26.66*** 
(0.000) 
 
Panel B: Top-Tier 
Mean 
P-Value 
N 
90.40 
- 
1394 
100.21 
- 
460 
91.48 
- 
505 
78.61 
- 
429 
21.60*** 
(0.000) 
 
Panel C: Non-Top-Tier 
Mean 
P-Value 
N 
74.59 
- 
1377 
92.21 
- 
455 
71.37 
- 
421 
61.30 
- 
501 
30.90*** 
(0.000) 
 
Panel D: In-House 
Mean 
P-Value 
N 
108.71 
- 
89 
113.67 
- 
39 
99.85 
- 
27 
110.70 
- 
23 
2.97 
(0.870) 
 
Panel E: Difference (Panel B – Panel C) 
Difference 
P-Value 
15.81*** 
(0.000) 
8.00* 
(0.093) 
20.12*** 
(0.000) 
17.30*** 
(0.000) 
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 Table 5: Bid Premium 
 
This table reports the bid premium for the full sample. Bid premium is obtained from 
Thomson One Banker. It is calculated as the difference between the deal price and the target’s 
stock price 4 weeks prior to the announcement divided by the target’s stock price 4 weeks 
prior to the announcement. Acquirers are divided into three groups based on KZ Index. 
Specifically, the lowest (highest) one third of acquirers ranked by their KZ Index are defined 
as unconstrained (constrained) acquirers. The middle one third of acquirers are sorted into the 
neutral group. Panel A relates to all deals in the sample. Panel B relates to deals advised by 
top-tier advisors. Panel C relates to deals advised by non-top-tier advisors. Panel D relates to 
in-house deals. Panel E relates to difference in acquirer performance between deals advised 
by top-tier and non-top-tier advisors. The variable (Bid Premium) is winsorized at the 3% and 
97% levels. The P-Value is shown in parentheses and is calculated using the t-test for the 
difference between sub-samples. Statistical significance at the 1% level, 5% level and 10% 
levels is denoted ***, ** and * respectively. 
 
 
All 
(A) 
Constrained 
(C) 
Neutral 
(N) 
Unconstrained 
(U) 
Difference 
(C) – (U) 
Panel A: All 
Mean 
P-Value 
N 
41.84% 
- 
1219 
39.68% 
- 
430 
42.09% 
- 
424 
44.09% 
- 
365 
-4.41%* 
(0.078) 
 
Panel B: Top-Tier 
Mean 
P-Value 
N 
39.79% 
- 
706 
36.99% 
- 
230 
38.20% 
- 
262 
44.75% 
- 
214 
-7.76%** 
(0.018) 
 
Panel C: Non-Top-Tier 
Mean 
P-Value 
N 
43.29% 
- 
445 
41.41% 
- 
171 
47.04% 
- 
141 
41.73% 
- 
133 
-0.33% 
(0.936) 
 
Panel D: In-House 
Mean 
P-Value 
N 
53.62% 
- 
68 
50.84% 
- 
29 
57.35% 
- 
21 
53.75% 
- 
18 
2.91% 
(0.813) 
 
Panel E: Difference (Panel B – Panel C) 
Difference 
P-Value 
-3.05%* 
(0.100) 
-4.42% 
(0.189) 
-8.83%** 
(0.020) 
3.01% 
(0.453) 
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Table 6: Acquirer Advisory Fees 
 
This table reports the acquirer advisory fees for the full sample. Acquirer advisory fees shown 
in million dollars are obtained from Thomson One Banker. Acquirers are divided into three 
groups based on KZ Index. Specifically, the lowest (highest) one third of acquirers ranked by 
their KZ Index are defined as unconstrained (constrained) acquirers. The middle one third of 
acquirers are sorted into the neutral group. Panel A relates to all deals in the sample. Panel B 
relates to deals advised by top-tier advisors. Panel C relates to deals advised by non-top-tier 
advisors. Panel D relates to difference in acquirer performance between deals advised by top-
tier and non-top-tier advisors. The P-Value is shown in parentheses and is calculated using the 
bootstrapping method for BHARs and the t-test for the difference between sub-samples. The 
variable (Acquirer Advisory Fees) is winsorized at the 3% and 97% levels. The P-Value is 
shown in parentheses and is calculated using the t-test for the difference between sub-samples. 
Statistical significance at the 1% level, 5% level and 10% levels is denoted ***, ** and * 
respectively. 
 
 
All 
(A) 
Constrained 
(C) 
Neutral 
(N) 
Unconstrained 
(U) 
Difference 
(C) – (U) 
Panel A: All 
Mean 
P-Value 
N 
3.68 
- 
483 
3.08 
- 
197 
4.11 
- 
158 
4.07 
- 
128 
-1.00 
(0.119) 
 
Panel B: Top-Tier 
Mean 
P-Value 
N 
5.55 
- 
236 
4.81 
- 
94 
5.68 
- 
84 
6.58 
- 
58 
-1.77 
(0.125) 
 
Panel C: Non-Top-Tier 
Mean 
P-Value 
N 
1.89 
- 
247 
1.50 
- 
103 
2.33 
- 
74 
2.00 
- 
70 
-0.50 
(0.339) 
 
Panel D: Difference (Panel B – Panel C) 
Difference 
P-Value 
3.66*** 
(0.000) 
3.31*** 
(0.000) 
3.35*** 
(0.000) 
4.58*** 
(0.000) 
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Table 7: Probit Model of Retaining Advisors 
 
This table presents results of the probit regression of the probability of retaining investment 
banker on financial constraint for the full sample. Specification 1, and 2 report the results for 
the probability of conducting in-house deals and the probability of retaining top-tier advisors 
respectively. The key explanatory variable is the KZ index. KZ Index is Kaplan and Zingales 
Index measured at the fiscal year end before the announcement. Other control variables 
include firm, deal and market characteristics. For firm characteristics, RUNUP is measured as 
market-adjusted CARs over the [-365, -28] window prior to announcement. LN(MV) is the 
natural logarithm of the market value of equity measured 4 weeks before the announcement. 
M/B is measured as market value of equity 4 weeks before the announcement divided by 
book value of equity at the fiscal year end before the announcement. P/E is measured as share 
price over earnings per share at the fiscal year end before the announcement. Leverage is 
measured as total debt over total capital at the fiscal year end before the announcement. ROE 
is measured as net income over shareholders’ equity at the fiscal year end before the 
announcement. Cash Flows/Equity is measured as cash flows at the fiscal year end before the 
announcement divided by market value of equity 4 weeks before the announcement. 
Experienced Bidder dummy equals one if the acquirer has conducted 3 or more M&A deals 
over the five years period before the acquisition in question. For deal characteristics, Relative 
Size is measured as the transaction value divided by the acquirer market value of equity 4 
weeks before the announcement. Public dummy equals one if the target is publicly listed. 
Stock dummy equals one if the deal is 100% paid by stock. Cash dummy equals one if the 
deal is 100% paid by cash. Competing Bid dummy equals one if the number of bidding firms 
is more than one. Diversification dummy equals one if the acquirer and the target have 
different first two-digit of primary SIC code. For market characteristics, M&A Heat Degree is 
measured as the moving average of the number of M&A deals in each quarter divided by the 
historical average of the number of M&A deals in all previous quarters going back to 1985. 
High Valuation Market dummy equals one if a deal is conducted during the period of high 
valuation market. Low Valuation Market equals one if a deal is conducted during the period 
of low valuation market. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 3% and 97% levels. 
We also control for industry fixed effects and year fixed effects. For brevity, they are not 
reported in the table. The P-Value shown in parentheses is adjusted for heteroskedasticity and 
bidder clustering. Significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels are denoted ***, ** and * 
respectively. 
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 (1) (2) 
 In-House Top-Tier 
KZ 0.0211*** -0.0015 
 (0.008) (0.339) 
RUNUP -0.3590* -0.1609** 
 (0.053) (0.025) 
LN(MV) -0.1075** 0.4455*** 
 (0.039) (0.000) 
M/B 0.0291* -0.0057 
 (0.065) (0.467) 
P/E 0.0015 0.0005 
 (0.235) (0.425) 
Leverage -0.2761 0.1549 
 (0.414) (0.233) 
ROE 0.4857 -0.3570** 
 (0.267) (0.024) 
Cash Flows/Equity -1.3363 1.4902*** 
 (0.319) (0.001) 
Experienced Bidder 0.2430 -0.0057 
 (0.141) (0.929) 
Relative Size -3.3819*** 0.6828*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Public 0.9698*** 0.1146* 
 (0.000) (0.051) 
Stock 0.2586 -0.1922** 
 (0.103) (0.017) 
Cash -0.1344 -0.0145 
 (0.458) (0.829) 
Competing Bid 0.2827 0.0578 
 (0.598) (0.791) 
Diversification 0.0923 -0.0588 
 (0.491) (0.332) 
Heat Degree 1.7613*** -0.3764*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
High Valuation Market 0.6282*** 0.0437 
 (0.000) (0.532) 
Low Valuation Market -0.0648 -0.0227 
 (0.821) (0.757) 
Constant -4.5768*** -2.8206*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
N 2860 2771 
pseudo R2 0.378 0.232 
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Table 8: Regression of Short-Term Performance 
 
This table presents results of the OLS regression of short-term performance for the sample of 
deals advised by investment banks. Specification 1, 2, 3 and 4 report the results for all, 
constrained, neutral and unconstrained acquirers, respectively. In these models we regress 
acquirer CAR [-2, 2] against a vector of explanatory variables. The key explanatory variable 
is the Top-Tier dummy that equals one if a top-tier advisor is retained by an acquirer. Other 
control variables include firm, deal and market characteristics. For firm characteristics, 
RUNUP is measured as market-adjusted CARs over the [-365, -28] window prior to 
announcement. LN(MV) is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity measured 4 
weeks before the announcement. M/B is measured as market value of equity 4 weeks before 
the announcement divided by book value of equity at the fiscal year end before the 
announcement. P/E is measured as share price over earnings per share at the fiscal year end 
before the announcement. Leverage is measured as total debt over total capital at the fiscal 
year end before the announcement. ROE is measured as net income over shareholders’ equity 
at the fiscal year end before the announcement. Cash Flows/Equity is measured as cash flows 
at the fiscal year end before the announcement divided by market value of equity 4 weeks 
before the announcement. Experienced Bidder dummy equals one if the acquirer has 
conducted 3 or more M&A deals over the five years period before the acquisition in question. 
For deal characteristics, Relative Size is measured as the transaction value divided by the 
acquirer market value of equity 4 weeks before the announcement. Public dummy equals one 
if the target is publicly listed. Stock dummy equals one if the deal is 100% paid by stock. 
Cash dummy equals one if the deal is 100% paid by cash. Hostile dummy equals one if the 
deal is identified as hostile or unsolicited by Thomson One Banker. Competing Bid dummy 
equals one if the number of bidding firms is more than one. Tender Offer dummy equals one 
if the deal is a tender offer. Diversification dummy equals one if the acquirer and the target 
have different first two-digit of primary SIC code. For market characteristics, M&A Heat 
Degree is measured as the moving average of the number of M&A deals in each quarter 
divided by the historical average of the number of M&A deals in all previous quarters going 
back to 1985. High Valuation Market dummy equals one if a deal is conducted during the 
period of high valuation market. Low Valuation Market equals one if a deal is conducted 
during the period of low valuation market. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 3% 
and 97% levels. We also control for industry fixed effects and year fixed effects. For brevity, 
they are not reported in the table. The P-Value shown in parentheses is adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity and bidder clustering. Significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels are 
denoted ***, ** and * respectively. 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 All Constrained Neutral Unconstrained 
Top-Tier 0.0028 0.0117* 0.0063 -0.0068 
 (0.476) (0.093) (0.300) (0.375) 
RUNUP 0.0035 -0.0041 0.0051 0.0014 
 (0.464) (0.637) (0.581) (0.862) 
LN(MV) -0.0050*** -0.0051** -0.0055*** -0.0047* 
 (0.000) (0.031) (0.005) (0.088) 
M/B 0.0004 -0.0016** 0.0013 0.0012 
 (0.422) (0.032) (0.179) (0.190) 
P/E -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0001* 0.0001 
 (0.960) (0.979) (0.057) (0.323) 
Leverage 0.0109 0.0092 -0.0051 0.0212 
 (0.171) (0.491) (0.725) (0.244) 
ROE 0.0082 0.0122 0.0136 -0.0032 
 (0.420) (0.424) (0.527) (0.864) 
Cash Flows/Equity 0.0033 -0.0284 0.0355 -0.0049 
 (0.905) (0.505) (0.600) (0.923) 
Experienced Bidder -0.0037 -0.0117* -0.0003 0.0045 
 (0.344) (0.097) (0.960) (0.539) 
Relative Size 0.0108* 0.0110 0.0031 0.0167 
 (0.089) (0.251) (0.764) (0.241) 
Public -0.0342*** -0.0297*** -0.0325*** -0.0395*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Stock -0.0032 -0.0026 0.0041 -0.0123 
 (0.520) (0.769) (0.621) (0.182) 
Cash 0.0146*** 0.0169** 0.0152** 0.0097 
 (0.000) (0.014) (0.020) (0.216) 
Hostile -0.0181 0.0040 -0.0268 -0.0321 
 (0.145) (0.842) (0.253) (0.139) 
Competing Bid -0.0257** -0.0587*** -0.0171 0.0085 
 (0.021) (0.004) (0.156) (0.737) 
Tender 0.0317*** 0.0237*** 0.0309*** 0.0412*** 
 (0.000) (0.008) (0.000) (0.000) 
Diversification -0.0054 -0.0111 -0.0035 -0.0043 
 (0.129) (0.123) (0.526) (0.527) 
Heat Degree -0.0365 -0.0300 -0.0128 -0.0632 
 (0.278) (0.623) (0.802) (0.319) 
High Valuation Market -0.0037 -0.0134 0.0181 -0.0206 
 (0.627) (0.295) (0.124) (0.141) 
Low Valuation Market 0.0028 0.0073 0.0245 -0.0165 
 (0.740) (0.631) (0.101) (0.277) 
Constant 0.0760** 0.0775 0.0470 0.1103 
 (0.040) (0.271) (0.405) (0.104) 
N 2771 915 926 930 
R2 0.092 0.147 0.108 0.110 
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Table 9: Regression of Long-Term Performance 
 
This table presents results of the OLS regression of long-term performance for the sample of 
deals advised by investment banks. Specification 1, 2, 3 and 4 report the results for all, 
constrained, neutral and unconstrained acquirers, respectively. In these models we regress 
acquirer BHAR36 against a vector of explanatory variables. The key explanatory variable is 
the Top-Tier dummy that equals one if a top-tier advisor is retained by an acquirer. Other 
control variables include firm, deal and market characteristics. For firm characteristics, 
RUNUP is measured as market-adjusted CARs over the [-365, -28] window prior to 
announcement. LN(MV) is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity measured 4 
weeks before the announcement. M/B is measured as market value of equity 4 weeks before 
the announcement divided by book value of equity at the fiscal year end before the 
announcement. P/E is measured as share price over earnings per share at the fiscal year end 
before the announcement. Leverage is measured as total debt over total capital at the fiscal 
year end before the announcement. ROE is measured as net income over shareholders’ equity 
at the fiscal year end before the announcement. Cash Flows/Equity is measured as cash flows 
at the fiscal year end before the announcement divided by market value of equity 4 weeks 
before the announcement. Experienced Bidder dummy equals one if the acquirer has 
conducted 3 or more M&A deals over the five years period before the acquisition in question. 
For deal characteristics, Relative Size is measured as the transaction value divided by the 
acquirer market value of equity 4 weeks before the announcement. Public dummy equals one 
if the target is publicly listed. Stock dummy equals one if the deal is 100% paid by stock. 
Cash dummy equals one if the deal is 100% paid by cash. Hostile dummy equals one if the 
deal is identified as hostile or unsolicited by Thomson One Banker. Competing Bid dummy 
equals one if the number of bidding firms is more than one. Tender Offer dummy equals one 
if the deal is a tender offer. Diversification dummy equals one if the acquirer and the target 
have different first two-digit of primary SIC code. For market characteristics, M&A Heat 
Degree is measured as the moving average of the number of M&A deals in each quarter 
divided by the historical average of the number of M&A deals in all previous quarters going 
back to 1985. High Valuation Market dummy equals one if a deal is conducted during the 
period of high valuation market. Low Valuation Market equals one if a deal is conducted 
during the period of low valuation market. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 3% 
and 97% levels. We also control for industry fixed effects and year fixed effects. For brevity, 
they are not reported in the table. The P-Value shown in parentheses is adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity and bidder clustering. Significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels are 
denoted ***, ** and * respectively. 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 All Constrained Neutral Unconstrained 
Top-Tier 0.1056*** 0.1367** 0.0761 0.0759 
 (0.003) (0.031) (0.153) (0.244) 
RUNUP -0.1067** -0.1331* -0.1857*** -0.0157 
 (0.011) (0.074) (0.009) (0.838) 
LN(MV) -0.0094 -0.0398* -0.0033 0.0157 
 (0.465) (0.094) (0.852) (0.570) 
M/B -0.0130*** -0.0198** -0.0146** -0.0066 
 (0.006) (0.010) (0.013) (0.380) 
P/E -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0004 -0.0002 
 (0.699) (0.982) (0.495) (0.744) 
Leverage 0.1389* 0.2533* 0.0707 0.1676 
 (0.075) (0.067) (0.557) (0.224) 
ROE -0.0733 -0.1107 -0.2653 0.0880 
 (0.388) (0.449) (0.104) (0.541) 
Cash Flows/Equity 0.8123*** 0.6696* 1.9444*** 0.0038 
 (0.001) (0.075) (0.000) (0.993) 
Experienced Bidder -0.0008 -0.0728 -0.0129 0.0571 
 (0.982) (0.239) (0.828) (0.400) 
Relative Size 0.0566 -0.0789 0.0395 0.3318*** 
 (0.272) (0.330) (0.635) (0.003) 
Public 0.0325 0.1120* -0.0424 0.0008 
 (0.365) (0.099) (0.403) (0.990) 
Stock -0.0399 -0.0890 -0.0469 -0.0409 
 (0.383) (0.284) (0.448) (0.650) 
Cash 0.0648** 0.0297 0.0198 0.1389** 
 (0.046) (0.640) (0.693) (0.014) 
Hostile 0.2876** 0.3528* 0.1434 0.4237 
 (0.034) (0.062) (0.579) (0.237) 
Competing Bid -0.1145 -0.2557 0.0115 -0.1325 
 (0.242) (0.167) (0.941) (0.477) 
Tender 0.0201 0.0126 0.0302 -0.0004 
 (0.645) (0.875) (0.651) (0.996) 
Diversification -0.0256 0.0423 -0.0098 -0.0932 
 (0.435) (0.490) (0.827) (0.107) 
Heat Degree 0.2060 -0.2466 0.3462 0.4515 
 (0.417) (0.599) (0.407) (0.312) 
High Valuation Market 0.0800 0.1088 -0.0711 0.2432** 
 (0.176) (0.309) (0.442) (0.012) 
Low Valuation Market -0.0082 0.0946 -0.0046 -0.1912* 
 (0.918) (0.543) (0.972) (0.084) 
Constant -0.6599** 0.1484 -0.8030* -1.3162*** 
 (0.022) (0.785) (0.088) (0.008) 
N 2771 915 926 930 
R2 0.103 0.141 0.161 0.151 
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Table 10: Regression of Long-Term Performance (using the SA index as the 
measure of financial constraint) 
 
This table presents results of the OLS regression of long-term performance for the sample of 
deals advised by investment banks. Specification 1, 2, 3 and 4 report the results for all, 
constrained, neutral and unconstrained acquirers, respectively. In this table, the SA index is 
used to measure firm’s financial constraint. In these models we regress acquirer BHAR36 
against a vector of explanatory variables. The key explanatory variable is the Top-Tier 
dummy that equals one if a top-tier advisor is retained by an acquirer. Other control variables 
include firm, deal and market characteristics. For firm characteristics, RUNUP is measured as 
market-adjusted CARs over the [-365, -28] window prior to announcement. LN(MV) is the 
natural logarithm of the market value of equity measured 4 weeks before the announcement. 
M/B is measured as market value of equity 4 weeks before the announcement divided by 
book value of equity at the fiscal year end before the announcement. P/E is measured as share 
price over earnings per share at the fiscal year end before the announcement. Leverage is 
measured as total debt over total capital at the fiscal year end before the announcement. ROE 
is measured as net income over shareholders’ equity at the fiscal year end before the 
announcement. Cash Flows/Equity is measured as cash flows at the fiscal year end before the 
announcement divided by market value of equity 4 weeks before the announcement. 
Experienced Bidder dummy equals one if the acquirer has conducted 3 or more M&A deals 
over the five years period before the acquisition in question. For deal characteristics, Relative 
Size is measured as the transaction value divided by the acquirer market value of equity 4 
weeks before the announcement. Public dummy equals one if the target is publicly listed. 
Stock dummy equals one if the deal is 100% paid by stock. Cash dummy equals one if the 
deal is 100% paid by cash. Hostile dummy equals one if the deal is identified as hostile or 
unsolicited by Thomson One Banker. Competing Bid dummy equals one if the number of 
bidding firms is more than one. Tender Offer dummy equals one if the deal is a tender offer. 
Diversification dummy equals one if the acquirer and the target have different first two-digit 
of primary SIC code. For market characteristics, M&A Heat Degree is measured as the 
moving average of the number of M&A deals in each quarter divided by the historical 
average of the number of M&A deals in all previous quarters going back to 1985. High 
Valuation Market dummy equals one if a deal is conducted during the period of high 
valuation market. Low Valuation Market equals one if a deal is conducted during the period 
of low valuation market. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 3% and 97% levels. 
We also control for industry fixed effects and year fixed effects. For brevity, they are not 
reported in the table. The P-Value shown in parentheses is adjusted for heteroskedasticity and 
bidder clustering. Significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels are denoted ***, ** and * 
respectively. 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 All Constrained Neutral Unconstrained 
Top-Tier 0.1056*** 0.1779** 0.1147** 0.0327 
 (0.003) (0.020) (0.037) (0.523) 
RUNUP -0.1067** -0.0121 0.0334 -0.3086*** 
 (0.011) (0.850) (0.632) (0.001) 
LN(MV) -0.0094 -0.1147*** -0.0291 0.0238 
 (0.465) (0.001) (0.308) (0.217) 
M/B -0.0130*** -0.0044 -0.0079 -0.0163* 
 (0.006) (0.498) (0.388) (0.061) 
P/E -0.0001 -0.0004 -0.0000 -0.0001 
 (0.699) (0.440) (0.948) (0.903) 
Leverage 0.1389* 0.2549* 0.0351 0.0073 
 (0.075) (0.058) (0.770) (0.951) 
ROE -0.0733 0.0790 -0.0819 -0.2032 
 (0.388) (0.582) (0.566) (0.230) 
Cash Flows/Equity 0.8123*** 0.5286 0.6373* 1.5430*** 
 (0.001) (0.243) (0.091) (0.002) 
Experienced Bidder -0.0008 -0.0496 -0.0138 0.0308 
 (0.982) (0.398) (0.810) (0.644) 
Relative Size 0.0566 -0.0259 0.0493 0.1352 
 (0.272) (0.756) (0.586) (0.133) 
Public 0.0325 0.0714 0.0042 -0.0731 
 (0.365) (0.343) (0.940) (0.166) 
Stock -0.0399 -0.0308 -0.0560 0.0588 
 (0.383) (0.657) (0.504) (0.459) 
Cash 0.0648** 0.0737 0.1197** 0.0050 
 (0.046) (0.334) (0.033) (0.909) 
Hostile 0.2876** 0.6944 0.8373*** 0.0232 
 (0.034) (0.340) (0.004) (0.880) 
Competing Bid -0.1145 -0.5547*** 0.0778 -0.0179 
 (0.242) (0.003) (0.717) (0.867) 
Tender 0.0201 -0.0060 0.0496 0.0140 
 (0.645) (0.962) (0.542) (0.792) 
Diversification -0.0256 -0.0788 0.0204 -0.0228 
 (0.435) (0.209) (0.757) (0.597) 
Heat Degree 0.2060 0.3846 0.3410 -0.0153 
 (0.417) (0.404) (0.434) (0.967) 
High Valuation Market 0.0800 -0.0794 0.2330** 0.0376 
 (0.176) (0.461) (0.021) (0.689) 
Low Valuation Market -0.0082 -0.1529 -0.0044 0.0629 
 (0.918) (0.278) (0.975) (0.567) 
Constant -0.6599** -0.0136 -0.7801 -0.7431 
 (0.022) (0.981) (0.114) (0.114) 
N 2771 934 922 915 
R2 0.103 0.154 0.139 0.178 
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Appendix 1: Top 25 U.S. Financial Advisor Ranking Based on Transaction Value 
 
The table presents the ranking of the top-25 investment banker based on the transaction value 
for acquisitions of U.S. targets over the period January 1990 to December 31, 2009 obtained 
from the Thomson One Banker. Panel A and Panel B present the financial advisor ranking in 
the two decades – 1990s and 2000s, respectively. Transaction value is shown in U.S. million 
dollars.  
 
Rank Financial Advisor Transaction Value Number of Deals 
Panel A: 1990 – 1999 
 
Top-Tier 
  
1 Goldman Sachs & Co 2,108,483.06 1,601 
2 Bank of America Merrill Lynch 1,756,874.86 2,153 
3 Morgan Stanley 1,669,074.77 1,338 
4 JP Morgan 1,366,348.57 1,691 
5 Credit Suisse 1,342,830.48 2,010 
6 Citi (Salomon Brother/Salomon Smith Barney) 1,192,974.73 1,676 
7 Barclays Capital (Lehman Brothers) 698,713.29 874 
8 Lazard 613,378.80 568 
9 UBS 435,536.00 1,018 
10 Deutsche Bank AG 369,381.67 969 
 
Non-Top-Tier 
  
11 Sagent Advisors Inc 240,950.63 183 
12 Commerzbank AG 233,242.03 326 
13 Allen & Co Inc 121,159.69 50 
14 Houlihan Lokey 111,308.94 390 
15 Gleacher & Co Inc 92,671.86 78 
16 Blackstone Group LP 69,979.81 142 
17 RBC Capital Markets 65,626.50 495 
18 Evercore Partners 63,025.41 11 
19 Societe Generale 59,085.45 103 
20 Greenhill & Co, LLC 59,037.24 30 
21 Rothschild 57,591.51 88 
22 RBS 49,244.64 341 
23 Keefe Bruyette & Woods Inc 43,877.64 233 
24 CIBC World Markets Inc 43,771.35 205 
25 Jefferies & Co Inc 42,621.50 544 
Panel B: 2000 – 2009 
 
Top-Tier 
  
1 Goldman Sachs & Co 4,130,646.38 1,653 
2 Morgan Stanley 3,069,775.38 1,299 
3 Bank of America Merrill Lynch 3,025,483.53 1,931 
4 JP Morgan 2,978,195.31 1,810 
5 Citi (Salomon Smith Barney) 2,511,363.84 1,490 
6 Credit Suisse 1,940,924.74 1,697 
7 Barclays Capital (Lehman Brothers) 1,869,741.79 1,008 
8 UBS 1,178,542.38 924 
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9 Lazard 1,002,150.94 843 
10 Deutsche Bank AG 938,850.17 634 
 
Non-Top-Tier 
  
11 Evercore Partners 681,438.52 173 
12 Wells Fargo & Co 381,847.10 477 
13 Commerzbank AG 356,887.07 138 
14 Houlihan Lokey 354,513.98 1,375 
15 Blackstone Group LP 304,486.73 127 
16 Greenhill & Co, LLC 242,046.54 117 
17 Sagent Advisors Inc 206,566.20 230 
18 Jefferies & Co Inc 193,171.26 858 
19 Rothschild 188,233.09 239 
20 Duff and Phelps 184,790.02 457 
21 BNP Paribas SA 174,201.15 42 
22 Centerview Partners LLC 169,952.29 29 
23 Moelis & Co 135,365.04 76 
24 Keefe Bruyette & Woods Inc 134,706.73 443 
25 Sandler O'Neill Partners 125,961.47 403 
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Appendix 2: Definitions of Control Variables 
 
This table describes control variables in the regressions of this paper. The definition and related literature for each variable are shown in the table. 
Panel A, B and C present firm characteristics, deal characteristics and market characteristics, respectively. 
 
Variable Definition 
Panel A: Firm Characteristics 
RUNUP Acquirer market-adjusted CARs before announcement date over the [-365, -28] window. 
LN(MV) The logarithm of the acquirer market value measured 4 weeks before the announcement (CRSP item PRC×SHROUT). 
M/B 
 
Market value of equity 4 weeks before the announcement (CRSP item PRC×SHROUT) divided by book value of equity 
at the fiscal year end before the announcement (Compustat item CEQ). 
P/E Share price over earnings per share at the fiscal year end before the announcement (Compustat item PRCC/EPSPX). 
Leverage 
 
Total debt over total capital at the fiscal year end before the announcement (Compustat item 
(DTLL+DLC)/(DLTT+DLC+SEQ)). 
ROE Net income over shareholders’ equity at the fiscal year end before the announcement (Compustat item NI/SEQ). 
Cash Flows/Equity 
 
Cash flows at the fiscal year end before the announcement (Compustat item IB+DP-DVP-DVC) divided by market value 
of equity 4 weeks before the announcement (CRSP item PRC×SHROUT). 
Experienced Bidder 
 
Dummy variable equals one if the acquirer who has conducted 3 or more M&A deals over the five years period before 
the acquisition in question. 
Panel B: Deal Characteristics 
Relative Size 
 
Transaction value (from Thomson One Banker) divided by the acquirer market value of equity 4 weeks before the 
announcement (CRSP item PRC×SHROUT). 
Public Dummy variable equals one if the target is a publicly listed firm. 
Stock Dummy variable equals one if the deal is 100% paid by stock. 
Cash Dummy variable equals one if the deal is 100% paid by cash. 
Hostile Dummy variable equals one if the deal attitude is identified as hostile or unsolicited by Thomson One Banker. 
Competing Bid Dummy variable equals one if there are more than one bidding firms reported by Thomson One Banker. 
Tender Offer Dummy variable equals one if the deal is identified as a tender offer by Thomson One Banker. 
Diversification Dummy variable equals one if the bidder and the target share the same first two-digit of primary SIC code. 
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Panel C: Market Characteristics 
M&A Heat Degree 
 
The moving average of the number of M&A deals in each quarter divided by the historical average of the number of 
M&A deals in all previous quarters going back to 1985. 
High Valuation Market9 Dummy equals one if a deal is conducted in high valuation month. 
Low Valuation Market Dummy equals one if a deal is conducted in low valuation month. 
 
                                                                
9 To measure stock market valuation, this paper follows the method of Bouwman, Fuller, and Nain (2009). Specifically, this paper initially detrend the monthly P/E ratios of the 
S&P 500 from 1985 to 2009. Subsequently, each month is classified as below or above average base on whether the detrended P/E ratio of the month is lower or higher than the 
past five-year average. Finally, the lowest 50% of below average months are identified as “Low Valuation Market”, while the highest 50% of above average months are identified 
as “High Valuation Market”. The monthly P/E ratios of the S&P 500 are acquired from Datastream. 
